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In international law, the word "doctrine" is generally applied to a
state's successful claim to some special prerogative presented thereafter
as a permanent part of the foreign policy of the state evincing the doc-
trine. Such claims are made constantly in international politics as part of
the continuous process of claim, counter-claim, testing of relative re-
sources and intensity of demand, and, finally, decision by accommoda-
tion, compromise, or imposition. Claimants often try to anticipate
success by immediately labelling their claims a doctrine. But names are
not decisive. Many such claims are characterized by others as unlawful
and successfully resisted. However, when the intensity of interest and
effective power of the claiming state are such that, whatever the general
reaction, it is plain that its claim will be made into controlling practice,
the assertion can no longer simply be dismissed as unlawful by others.
Rather, it is widely accorded the more ambiguous quasi-legal term of
"doctrine." This reaction is not an abnegation of law, but is part of the
tendency of the international legal system to remain minimally relevant
by accommodating to the unyielding realities of effective power.
Several claims that the United States has openly pressed at the interna-
tional level since 1981 have come to be known as the "Reagan doctrine."
Labelling them as Ronald Reagan's handiwork suggests that they are
genuine innovations in national policy and international law. In fact,
each of the components of the Reagan doctrine has long been a part of
U.S. practice and at least one of them had long before Reagan acquired a
measure of international authority. Moreover, each finds at least an ap-
t Substantial portions of this paper were delivered at the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law, April 11, 1987, in Boston, Massachusetts. An
abbreviated version will be published in the Proceedings of the American Society of
International Law.
t Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School.
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proximate counterpart in the coordinate repertory of practice of the
other major superpower: the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine."
The persistent continuity of the Reagan and Brezhnev doctrines is im-
portant. If the components of these doctrines were novel or idiosyncratic
or a momentary national aberration, one could assume that the knotty
issue of their lawfulness would soon be rendered moot, thanks to the
recent change of personnel in Moscow and the impending change of per-
sonnel and perhaps party in Washington. Instead, precisely because
these are claims that the United States and the Soviet Union have long
made on the international community and because each can be viewed as
a deeply rooted national policy, questions about their status as interna-
tional law and their soundness as rational and inclusively beneficial inter-
national policy will be as urgent in 1989 as they were in 1981.
Both the Reagan and the Brezhnev doctrines claim special national
prerogatives with regard to two distinct matters: that of policing the alli-
ance and alignment of states within a designated defensive perimeter, and
that of overtly supporting unilaterally selected insurgents in states be-
yond the perimeter. Though there is a significant interstimulation be-
tween these components, each may be considered separately.
I. Exclusive Claims to "Protect" Geographical Areas
A. Origins
A primary component of the Reagan doctrine has been the claim that
the United States would resist, by unilateral use of force if necessary, the
direct or proxy penetration of Soviet power in predesignated geographi-
cal areas. It has become increasingly common to use the term "sphere of
influence" to describe the right to such actions. But a sphere of influ-
ence, as a term of art, does not really approximate the current practice.
A sphere of influence is not only a claim to bar efforts by other states to
establish dominant influence within the designated geographical area, but
also an option asserted erga omnes to annex some or all of the territory in
the area in the future. The Reagan claim might be better described as a
"critical defense zone,"1 with primary emphasis on excluding the intro-
duction of dominant influence* by the adversary into the zone, while
preventing the defection from alliance or alignment of states already
within it. It differs from a multilateral defense treaty in that the state
within the defense zone need not and often does not feel in need of de-
fense nor need it agree with the arrangement.
1. See Reisman, Critical Defense Zones and International Law: The Reagan Codicil, 76
AM. J. INT'L L. 589 (1982).
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This is not a claim unique to the United States and it is not without
basis in superpower agreement. The deal that established defense zones
between the United States and the Soviet Union was cut near the end of
the Second World War. A set of agreements, generally attributed to
meetings at Yalta but actually concluded before, established understand-
ings about what were tantamount to spheres of influence within Europe.
2
Churchill recounts a comparable understanding with regard to the
Balkans. 3 The understandings appear to have been reconfirmed, in part,
in the Nixon-Brezhnev d6tente agreements and in the Helsinki Accords.
4
These understandings have not been easy or consistently cordial. The
allocation of at least supervisory control over specific geographic zones
was implicitly recognized through the Truman period by the very term
the President and his Secretary of State Dean Acheson chose to describe
their policy: "containment." A major war in Asia was fought in its
name and vigorous support was given to one side in a very nasty civil war
in the Balkans to effect the policy.
The Eisenhower Administration came into office criticizing contain-
ment as immoral, because it permitted communism to operate in those
places where it had seized control. Instead of containment, Eisenhower's
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles promised "Operation Rollback."
But when Hungary revolted against Soviet rule in 1956 and waited for
Rollback, Eisenhower and Dulles did nothing, effectively confirming
their acceptance, if not endorsement, of the Soviet-claimed zone.
B. Soviet Claims
5
When the Soviet Union intervened in Hungary, Nikita Khruschev's
justification was quite crude. He stated:
We understood that we might be reproached for allegedly interfering in the
internal affairs of Hungary. But, recognizing our international duty, we
decided that a Socialist country with the strength and opportunity to aid
another fraternal country could not stand aside, while workers, working
2. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE CONFERENCES AT MALTA AND YALTA, 1945
(1955).
3. 6 W. CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR 227-28 (1953).
4. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1975 DIG. U. S. PRAC. INT'L L. 8-12 (1976); 73 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 323-50 (1975).
5. For a discussion of Czarist precursors to the Brezhnev Doctrine, see Valenta, From
Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion, 5 INT'L SEC. 114, 119 (1980) ("Russian Czars
and Soviet leaders alike have traditionally been sensitive about the security of nearby countries.
They have used force to restore stability and maintain or bring into power friendly pro-Russian
or pro-Soviet regimes.").
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peasants and communists were being hanged and shot by Horthyites and
other counter-revolutionary scum.
6
When, a decade later, the Soviets intervened in Czechoslovakia, they de-
veloped a more sophisticated justification, this time replete with selected
symbols of international law. Though published under the name of
Kovalev, this new justification is generally referred to as the "Brezhnev
doctrine." The statement, published in Pravda on September 26, 1968, 7
acknowledged that "it is impossible to ignore the allegations being heard
in some places that the actions of the five Socialist countries contradict
the Marxist-Leninist principle of sovereignty and the right of nations to
self-determination."'8 These allegations ignored "basic principles," which
Kovalev proceeded to set out:
[T]he peoples of the socialist countries and the Communist Parties have and
must have freedom to determine their country's path of development, How-
ever, any decision of theirs must damage neither socialism in their own
country nor the fundamental interests of the other socialist countries nor
the world wide workers' movement ....
The weakening of any link in the world socialist system has a direct
effect on all the socialist countries, which cannot be indifferent to this.
Thus, the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia were in essence using talk
about the right to self-determination to cover up demands for so-called
neutrality [and Czechoslovakia's] withdrawal from the socialist common-
wealth. But implementation of such "self-determination," i.e., Czechoslo-
vakia's separation from the socialist commonwealth, would run counter to
Czechoslovakia's fundamental interests and would harm the other socialist
countries. Such "self-determination," as a result of which NATO troops
might approach Soviet borders and the Commonwealth of European social-
ist countries would be dismembered, in fact infringes on the vital interests
of these countries' peoples, and fundamentally contradicts the right of these
peoples to socialist self-determination. The Soviet Union and other socialist
states, in fulfilling their internationalist duty to the fraternal peoples of
Czechoslovakia and defending their own socialist gains, had to act and did
act in resolute opposition to the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia. 9
The Soviets do not view this as a purely political doctrine. Instead, they
believe it to be established international law. Professor Tunkin, the fore-
most Soviet international lawyer, explains that:
6. 10 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PREss 6 (1958) [hereinafter CDSP].
7. Kovalev, Sovereignty and the Internationalist Obligations of Socialist Countries, Pravda,
Sept. 26, 1968, at 4, trans. in 20 CDSP, No. 39, at 10-11.
8. Id. at 10.
9. Id.
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The Soviet state, as the "oldest" socialist state whose historic fate has been
the most difficult task of paving the way for a new socioeconomic forma-
tion, always precisely fulfills its duties arising from the principle of socialist
internationalism. A vivid manifestation of this policy is the assistance of
the Soviet Union to the Hungarian people in 1956 and the assistance, to-
gether with other socialist countries, to the people of Czechoslovakia in
1968 in protecting socialist gains and, ultimately, in defending their sover-
eignty and independence from sudden swoops of imperialism .... 10
Afghanistan, as the Soviets would explain it, was protected from one of
those "swoops of imperialism" in 1979. On December 27, Soviet troops
entered Afghanistan, overthrew and killed President Amin, and placed
Babrak Karmal in power. The Soviets claimed that they had done this at
the request of Babrak Karmal. That could well have been the case. The
only problem with proposing this as an international legal justification
was that Karmal held no post in the Afghanistan government at the
time. He had been in Moscow, but was apparently transferred to Tash-
kent, where he issued the requisite invitation." At the Twenty-sixth
Party Congress in 1981, Brezhnev, more to the point, explained that
"[i]mperialism unleashed a real undeclared war against the Afghan
revolution. This created a direct threat to the security of our southern
border. The situation compelled us to provide the military assistance
that this friendly country asked for." 1 2 One-third of the Afghan popula-
tion has since fled its country and now comprises over half of the world's
refugee population. The Afghan resistance continues to fight the Soviet
intervention in a vicious and remarkably underreported war.
C. US. Claims
The United States' claim to a special security responsibility in the
Western hemisphere evolved from the Monroe Doctrine-which self-au-
thorized the United States to resist the reintroduction of European power
in the New World in the nineteenth centuryI 3-to an explicit doctrine
against communist penetration in the western hemisphere in the twenti-
eth. The Rio Treaty14 had been designed to respond to direct territorial
10. G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 435-36 (W. Butler trans. 1974).
11. For background information on the circumstances surrounding the Soviet invasion of
Afganistan, see A. ARNOLD, AFGHANISTAN: THE SOVIET INVASION IN PERSPECTIVE (rev.
ed. 1985).
12. Brezhnev's Report to Congress - I, Pravda, Feb. 23, 1981, at 2, trans. in 33 CDSP, No.
8, at 3, 7. The claim of defense has proved to be a recurring refrain.
13. Monroe Doctrine, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 1823), reprinted in 2 J. RICH-
ARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1887
207, 218-19 (1898).
14. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S.
No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 93.
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aggression. As it became clear that overt military aggression was no
longer the probable mode of Soviet intervention, the United States initi-
ated other norms that were established both regionally and domestically
by independent executive and congressional actions. At the Eighth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Organiza-
tion of American States resolved:
In order to achieve their subversive purposes and hide their true intentions,
the communist governments and their agents exploit the legitimate needs of
the less-favored sectors of the population and the just national aspirations
of the various peoples. With the pretext of defending popular interests,
freedom is suppressed, democratic institutions are destroyed, human rights
are violated and the individual is subjected to materialistic ways of life im-
posed by the dictatorship of the single party. Under the slogan of "anti-
imperialism" they try to establish an oppressive, aggressive, imperialism,
which subordinates the subjugated nations to the militaristic and aggressive
interests of extracontinental powers. By maliciously utilizing the very prin-
ciples of the inter-American system, they attempt to undermine democratic
institutions and to strengthen and protect political penetration and aggres-
sion.... The principles of communism are incompatible with the princi-
ples of the inter-American system.
15
The special role that the United States arrogated for itself in implement-
ing this policy had already been expressed by President Kennedy in April
1961. In remarks following the abortive U.S. invasion of Cuba, Kennedy
stated:
Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of non-interference
merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction-if the nations of this
Hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Commu-
nist penetration-then I want it clearly understood that this Government
will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are to the secur-
ity of our Nation!
16
In intervening in the Dominican Republic in 1965, President Johnson
said:
We are not the aggressor in the Dominican Republic. Forces came in there
and overthrew that government and became alined [sic] with evil persons
who had been trained in overthrowing governments and in seizing govern-
ments and establishing Communist control, and we have resisted that con-
15. Organization of American States Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of For-
eign Affairs, Serving as Organs of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance, reprinted in 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 601, 604-05 (1962) [hereinafter OAS
Eighth Meeting].
16. Address by President John Kennedy, American Society of Newspaper Editors (Apr.
20, 1961), reprinted in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, JOHN F.
KENNEDY, JAN. 20 TO DEC. 31, 1961, at 304 (1962).
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trol and we have sought to protect our citizens against what would have
taken place.17
In the same year, the House of Representatives resolved that
(1) any [international communist] subversive domination or threat of it
violates the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, and of collective security as
set forth in the acts and resolutions heretofore adopted by the American
Republics; and
(2) in any such situation any one or more of the high contracting parties
to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance may, in the exercise
of individual or collective self-defense, which could go so far as resort to
armed force, and in accordance with the declarations and principles above
stated, take steps to forestall or combat intervention, domination, control
and colonization of whatever form, by the subversive forces known as inter-
national communism and its agencies in the Western hemisphere. 18
D. Comparisons
Even this brief review of the Soviet and U.S. doctrines reveals certain
common features and differences. Both doctrines are based in part on
security and allegedly defensive strategic considerations. Each expresses
the view that the approach by an adversary into its own buffer areas
would pose an unacceptable security risk, a risk so great that it would
require the threatened state to resort to an anticipatory action that would
be unlawful in other circumstances and, in particular, had it been taken
by other actors. The Brezhnev doctrine, it will be recalled, states that
Czech "'self-determination,' as a result of which NATO troops might
approach Soviet borders and the commonwealth of European socialist
countries would be dismembered, in fact infringes on the vital interests of
these countries' peoples .... -19 With regard to the justification for So-
viet competence over Poland, Pravda reported with approval a statement
by Gustav Husak on April 7, 1981, to the effect that "Poland's continued
existence as a strong link in the socialist commonwealth is an important
factor making for stability in European and world politics."' 20 With re-
gard to Afghanistan, an editorial in Pravda in January 1980 asserted that
"it was not an imaginary but a real threat to the security interests of the
17. 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 822 (1965); see also id. at 744 (The United States made "a con-
stant effort to restore peace" and "had no desire to interfere in the affairs of a sister Repub-
lic."); id. at 858 ("The ultimate goal of the Organization of American States" is "to promote
the establishment of democratic institutions in the sister Republic.").
18. H.R. Res. 560, 89th Cong., lst Sess., 111 CONG. REC. 24,347 (1965) (the vote was 312
to 52, with 3 not present and 65 not voting).
19. See supra note 9.
20. Igor Sinitsin, The Great Strength of Unity, Pravda, Apr. 24, 1981, at 1, trans. in 33
CDSP, No. 17, at 4.
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Soviet state that was created on its sourthern [sic] border. '21 On the
other side of the planet, the OAS Resolution, using symmetrical argu-
ments, viewed communist takeovers of American states as not only
undermining democratic institutions but also providing a cover for
"political penetration and aggression."'22
There are also significant differences between the U.S. and Soviet for-
mulas. All of the unilateral American doctrines considered up to now
are territorially specific: they relate to the western hemisphere, as they
have done since the Monroe doctrine. Exercises beyond that hemisphere,
as, for example, in Korea and Vietnam, had treaty bases, unequivocal
invitations from governments, and a measure of multilateral if not inter-
national support. The Brezhnev doctrine, in contrast, manages to convey
a certain regional redolence, but in fact it is drafted in terms of a poten-
tial worldwide jurisdiction: any state that becomes a member of the so-
cialist commonwealth comes permanently under the Brezhnev doctrine.
Thus, from the perspective of strict Soviet interpretation of Brezhnev, the
Soviet military presence in Afghanistan is of a piece with the various
programs of diplomacy and military action in East Germany, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Here one encounters the interactive, rather
than the conclusory unilateral character of doctrines in international law.
The United States and the majority of members of the United Nations
have essentially accommodated themselves to all of these cases, except
for Afghanistan;23 expectations are still fluid with respect to this most
recent expansive application of the Brezhnev doctrine.
This particular imbalance in the Soviet and American claims was par-
tially redressed on January 23, 1980, when Jimmy Carter issued what
was promptly named the "Carter doctrine":
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to
gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the
21. On the U.S. President's Message, Pravda, Jan. 29, 1980, at 4, trans. in 32 CDSP,
No. 4, at 1, 3. Whether or not one accepts that assertion at face value it is plain that the Soviet
Union does not automatically act in areas in which the Brezhnev doctrine self-authorizes. As
Valenta notes, the Soviet Union came close but did not intervene in Yugoslavia, did not inter-
vene in China, and did not act directly in Poland in the upheavals of 1956 and 1970, Valenta,
supra note 5, at 119.
22. OAS Eighth Meeting, supra note 15, at 604.
23. The Security Council Draft Resolution of January 6, 1980, condemning the invasion
was vetoed by the Soviet Union, 34 U.N. SCOR (2190th mtg.) at 4, U.N. Doc. S/13729 (1980).
The General Assembly has consistently condemned the intervention. See 34 U.N. GAOR at
2, U.N. Doc. E.S. 6/2 (1980); G.A. Res. 35/37, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 17, U.N.
Doc. A/35/48 (1981); G.A. Res. 36/34, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/
36/51 (1982); G.A. Res. 37/37, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 25-26, U.N. Doc. A/37/51
(1983); G.A. Res. 38/29, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 24-25, U.N. Doc. A/38/47 (1984);
G.A. Res. 40/12, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 21-22, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1986); G.A.
Res. 41/33, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 24-25, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1987).
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vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be
repelled by any means necessary, including military force.
24
The Carter doctrine extends beyond the Western hemisphere but still,
in many ways, differs from the Brezhnev doctrine. It is essentially nega-
tive and exclusory, in that it is primarily aimed at preventing the forcible
entry of another power into an area comprised of independent states. In
that respect, it may be deemed consistent with principles established in
the U.N. Charter, for it tries to insure the independence of the govern-
ments within the region covered by an anticipatory, prophylactic, and
area-specific public commitment to use military force for that purpose.
But the Carter doctrine does begin to approximate one of the Brezhnev
doctrine's characteristics in that it is no longer limited to the Western
hemisphere.
On October 1, 1981, President Reagan issued statements that the
White House immediately characterized as the "Reagan codicil to the
Carter doctrine." In response to a question, the President emphatically
stated that the United States will not permit Saudi Arabia to "be an
Iran."' 25 In clarification, the President added that "in Iran I think the
United States has to take some responsibility for what happened."' 26 Im-
mediately afterwards, a White House aide explained to the New York
Times that "the President was now pledging to support the Saudi monar-
chy against internal as well as external threats."
'27
The Reagan codicil was obviously animated by the same security con-
cern that had motivated President Carter: the'vital importance of the
Persian Gulf area to NATO and, more generally, to the political and
economic systems that support it. The difference between Carter and
Reagan is neither in conception of national interest nor in expression of
national commitment, but rather entirely in contingency: in the antici-
pated method of incursion. The Carter doctrine contemplates an essen-
tially classical military seizure by overt attack. The Reagan codicil
addresses itself to the equally if not more likely method of infiltration and
subversion, followed by a coup, the invitation of a foreign government to
provide assistance, and so on. It is thus not original but essentially arith-
metical, for it does little more than add 1961 Kennedy to 1979 Carter.
The Carter declaration was extremely important, both as a develop-
ment, or at least publication, of American strategic conceptions and as a
24. The State of the Union, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 197 (Jan. 23, 1980).
25. Smith, Reagan and the Saudis, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1981, at Al, col. 4.
26. Transcript of President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 2, 1981, at A26, col. 5.
27. Smith, supra note 25, at Al, col. 5.
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new claim on international law. It should be emphasized, however, that
neither the Carter doctrine nor the Reagan codicil has really been rele-
vant to the more recent Reagan administration posture in the Caribbean
and Central America. On March 1, 1985, President Reagan said:
The Soviet attempt to give legitimacy to its tyranny is expressed in the infa-
mous Brezhnev doctrine, which contends that once a country has fallen
into Communist darkness, it can never again be allowed to see the light of
freedom.
Well, it occurs to me that history has already begun to repeal that doc-
trine. It started one day in Grenada. We only did our duty, as a responsi-
ble neighbor and a lover of peace, the day we went in and returned the
government to the people and rescued our own students. We restored that
island to liberty. Yes, it's only a small island, but that's what the world is
made of-small islands yearning for freedom.
28
Rhetorical idiosyncracies aside, it could have been Kennedy or John-
son: Ronald Reagan can claim no innovation here. U.S. actions in that
theater are consistent with the United States' conception of its interests
and its behavior for decades. If one sought a specific declaration by a
U.S. president that expressed Ronald Reagan's conception of present
U.S. regional objectives and rights, it could certainly be Kennedy's mani-
festo of April 1961.
E. New Stresses
Durable grandes ententes usually rest on symmetrical claims and ac-
quiescences. The understanding traced back to Yalta now seems to be
challenged by a lack of congruence in conceptions of what constitutes an
acceptable defense zone. The Soviets are inexorably following the logic of
Brezhnev as they see it: a continuously expanding "defensive" perimeter,
each new territory added to the zone then being coercively reshaped into
a communist and totalitarian state, becoming an indispensable link in the
chain of the Socialist commonwealth, thereafter permanently assured of
Soviet maintenance of its soi disant revolution. Afghanistan, in the So-
viet view, is as appropriate an application of the doctrine as is Poland or
Nicaragua. In a speech delivered on April 17, 1980, in the presence of
Babrak Karmal, then Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Brezhnev stated
that "[t]he revolutionary process in Afghanistan is irreversible. The Af-
ghan people and their government have on their side the support and
28. Remarks at the Conservative Political Action Conference's Twelfth Annual Dinner, 21
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 243 (Mar. 8, 1985) [hereinafter Conservative PAC Dinner].
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solidarity of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states and of pro-
gressive forces the world over." 29
Each of these putative extensions of the Brezhnev doctrine has goaded
a different American administration into a severe response. President
Carter imposed sanctions and President Reagan has openly supported
the contras and the mujahiddin. And in 1985, in a single remark in an-
ticipation of the full-blown Reagan doctrine, the President said that the
United States should accept neither the legitimacy nor the finality of So-
viet control of central Europe.30 That remark, not surprisingly, occa-
sioned a very sharp and nervous response from Moscow.
Unquestionably, the old understanding between Roosevelt, Churchill,
and Stalin has been under great stress in recent years. In an important
speech on February 22, 1985, in which U.S. attitudes toward the
Brezhnev doctrine were significantly modulated, Secretary of State
Shultz seemed to be implying that the reason for that understanding's
deterioration was its consistent violation by the Soviet Union. Shultz
explained:
When Soviet Politburo member Gorbachev was in London recently, he af-
firmed that Nicaragua had gained independence only with the Sandinista
takeover. The Soviets and their proxies thus proceed on the theory that any
country not Marxist-Leninist is not truly independent, and, therefore, the
supply of money, arms, and training to overthrow its government is legiti-
mate. Again: "What's mine is mine. What's yours is up for grabs." This
is the Brezhnev doctrine.
31
Part of the more developed U.S. response amplifying this view will be
considered below with regard to the second aspect of the Reagan and
Brezhnev doctrines.
F. International Legal Evaluation
Thus far, we have discussed the development of a reciprocally benefi-
cial superpower arrangement expressed in symmetrical doctrines. Are
any of these doctrines, however, lawful under contemporary interna-
tional law?
Unquestionably, a claim for an exclusive competence to exercise polit-
ical supervision over otherwise sovereign states in certain designated re-
gions attenuates pro tanto the political independence and right of self-
29. Afghanistan's Karmal Comes to Moscow, Pravda, Oct. 17, 1980, at 2, trans. in 32
CDSP, No. 42, at 7.
30. Conservative PAC Dinner, supra note 28, at 245.
31. Address by Secretary of State George Shultz to the Commonwealth Club, America and
the Struggle for Freedom (Feb. 22, 1985), reprinted in 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 16, 20 (1985) [here-
inafter Shultz].
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determination of the supervised states. If an evaluation of the interna-
tional lawfulness of a particular activity is based only on its congruence
with some authoritative text, one need proceed no further. Under textual
inquiry neither the Brezhnev nor the Reagan doctrine is lawful. But if an
assessment of lawfulness includes an examination of the probable conse-
quences of the activity and of its feasible alternatives in terms of the
maintenance of minimum order in the international community and their
contribution to other authorized goals, then such an inquiry has perforce
only begun. The widest military and political context must be examined
as well as the minimum and more general goals of the community con-
cerned in order to ascertain what positive or negative contributions the
Reagan and Brezhnev doctrines make to them.
Contemporary international politics cannot be comprehended without
reference to the nuclear balance established between the superpowers.
That balance prevents a catastrophic war which could well render this
planet uninhabitable and destroy our species. Given the resources in-
volved, the superpowers ultimately have the exclusive control necessary
to avoid this catastrophe. Every sane person has an interest in seeing
that balance maintained. Even those who accept, or even participate in,
the superpower competition expect and demand that each superpower
comport itself so as to avoid any direct conflict with a potential for nu-
clear escalation.
These unyielding realities of power virtually compel a daily, implicit
world plebiscite that authorizes the two superpowers to avoid a global
war through a complex and coordinated system of explicit and tacit mu-
tual deterrents, and to see to it that local conflicts do not spread and
threaten global conflagration. Implicitly and inexorably, a degree of au-
thority is added to that control. This means that, legal formula and dem-
ocratic theory notwithstanding, one indispensable level of international
lawmaking is essentially assigned to a club of two. There may be relative
differences between the superpowers with regard to their dependence on
their allies, the extent to which they share power with them, or the extent
to which they are open to influence by or dialogue with them. There is
no question, however, about where the ultimate power rests on either
side. Nor can there be any question about the fact that this special two-
player process will be inconsistent, procedurally and, sometimes, even in
terms of substantive results, with criteria prescribed in the formal texts of
international law.
We have no name for this essentially diadic superpower process of
making and applying basic survival norms. In the eighteenth century,
scholars and diplomats referred to the "public law of Europe," as distinct
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from the droit des gens or law of nations. Nor is this process completely
unknown in contemporary international law. In the 1950 phase of the
South West Africa case, Lord McNair, in a separate opinion, observed
that:
[F]rom time to time it happens that a group of great Powers, or a large
number of States both great and small, assume a power to create by a multi-
partite treaty some new international regime or status, which soon acquires
a degree of acceptance and durability extending beyond the limits of the
actual contracting parties, and giving it an objective existence.
32
The diadic process referred to herein cannot properly be called interna-
tional constitutional law, for there is a world constitutive process in
many sectors in which there is very wide participation. Instead, it is but
one part of the world constitutive process. Perhaps the term "rules of the
game" might be appropriate to designate these diadically established sur-
vival norms. However labelled, they and the processes by which they are
shaped are, I submit, international law-indeed, a very special type of
international law. Because the avoidance of nuclear war is the conditio
sine qua non of contemporary international law, these particular interna-
tional prescriptions are so important as to preempt other norms that may
prove to be inconsistent with them.
Some may disagree with this position. If one adheres to the belief that
law is a permanently closed, textual system, then this process of making
and applying the basic norms of survival by the superpowers is per se
unlawful. Conversely, if one dismisses law as no more than a convenient
camouflage for those who have effective power, then the lawfulness or the
unlawfulness of these arrangements suddenly becomes an irrelevant ques-
tion. If one accepts, however, the self-evident proposition that law is a
human artifact, created and maintained by people to facilitate their lives
together, then it is obvious that law must always be grounded in reality.
And these survival norms or "rules of the game" are not only grounded
in the reality we inhabit, but are also the condition of its continuation.
Precisely because survival norms advanced by the Reagan and
Brezhnev doctrines are law, it is appropriate here to explore whether,
within the bounds of possibility, there are other arrangements that can
better achieve the common survival objective. This requires criteria for
evaluation. Obviously, the criteria that must be deployed in this ap-
praisal cannot be those of the formal system alone. The primary crite-
rion of evaluation must instead be whether the "rule" in question
contributes to the maintenance of minimum order between the powers.
32. International Status of South West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 153 (Advisory Opinion of July
11) (separate opinion by Sir Arnold McNair).
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Second, if the answer to that question is in the affirmative, one must ad-
dress whether that particular objective is accomplished in ways that min-
imize the violation of the norms of the formal system. If the answer to
the second question is also in the affirmative, then these "rules of the
game" would appear to be lawful. If, on the other hand, the answer is
negative, it is incumbent on the scholar, who sees his role not only as a
describer but also as a contributor to the enhanced performance of law,
to explore alternative methods for achieving the larger security objective
with less violence to the norms of the formal system.
I submit that the basic critical defense zone claims made by the United
States and the Soviet Union are lawful, precisely because they are indis-
pensable to the avoidance of serious conflict. Conflicts may erupt from
mistakes and misperceptions. Because of the speed, total destructiveness,
and irrevocability of the contemporary instruments of violence, mini-
mum world order requires that states communicate to their adversaries,
clearly and in advance, exactly which parts of the planet they deem indis-
pensable to their security and, hence, which expansive political or mili-
tary changes initiated by or enuring to the benefit of an adversary will be
unacceptable and likely to lead to war. It is important that these com-
munications be clearly received and that, through tacit or explicit bar-
gaining, they succeed in establishing clear and plausible expectations
about where and for what purposes the lines are drawn.
These claimed zones, however, can be deemed lawful only insofar as
they relate directly and plausibly to superpower defense, no further. The
exclusion of an adversary's influence may be justified in terms of the
maintenance of world order, but aggressive realignments of unaffiliated
states and interventions in the internal public order of states within criti-
cal defense zones cannot be thus justified.3 3 Precisely because inclusive
security is the justification for the exclusion of the adversary and the at-
tenuation of other states' rights, nothing but exclusion can be demanded
in the name of the Reagan and Brezhnev doctrines.
Examining the international lawfulness of these parts of the two doc-
trines in terms of the functioning of common survival norms, it would
appear that the United States may demand an appropriately neutral
stance by the Nicaraguan government, but may not, in the absence of
other international authority, insist that Nicaragua rearrange its internal
order in ways that cater to Washington's ideological proclivities. Eden
Pastora Gomez reports a conversation between Assistant Secretary of
33. See Reisman, supra note 1, at 589-90.
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State Thomas Enders and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega in Au-
gust, 1981, which puts the matter in unequivocal and brutal terms:
Enders had told Daniel [Ortega] that the Nicaraguans could do whatever
they wished-that.., they could take over La Prensa, they could expropri-
ate private property, they could suit themselves-but they must not con-
tinue meddling in El Salvador, dragging Nicaragua into an East-West
confrontation, and if they continued along these lines, Enders said, they
would be smashed.
34
By the same standards, the Soviet Union may insist on a non-aligned
and, at least in terms of superpower rivalries, a relatively neutral Afghan-
istan, but it may not invade it in order to transform it coercively into a
people's republic after its own image. Some evidence of international
support for the above restriction can be found in the overwhelming inter-
national revulsion at the brutal suppression of the Czech spring, a mod-
est effort at liberalization in eerie anticipation of what one hopes is the
purpose of General Secretary Gorbachev's current campaign. It is quite
significant in this regard that muc international opinion simultaneously
has been in favor of Solidarity but has not suggested that Poland should
also be permitted to leave the Eastern bloc. Similarly, it is my impression
that elite opinion has leaned toward the conception of a non-aligned Af-
ghanistan, while simultaneously strongly condemning the Soviet invasion
and broader presence there. 35
In sum, there is a core in both the Brezhnev and Reagan doctrines that
contributes, and indeed may be indispensable to, the maintenance of cur-
rent minimum world order. Like any other legal conception, however,
the doctrines contain the potential for abuse. When such abuse occurs,
the extension of such doctrines exceeds lawfulness.
II. Logistical Support for "Freedom Fighters"
Far more controversial than President Reagan's critical defense or
sphere of influence doctrine has been his claim of a national competence
to support selected insurgents against existing governments. These insur-
gents are dubbed "freedom fighters." Not every insurgent group qualifies
for this title. The Nicaraguan contras have, as have Savimbi's UNITA
and the Afghan mujahiddin. But, to name only a few of the rejects, the
34. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 409 (Judgment of June 27, 1986) [hereinafter Nicaragua case] (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
35. It should be noted in this regard that a recent General Assembly resolution on Afghan-
istan condemns the foreign intervention but also adopts as a goal that the "non-aligned charac-
ter of Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solution of the problem." G.A. Res. 41/33, 41
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 24, U.N. Doe. A/41/L.12 and Add. 1 (1986) (adopted by a
vote of 122 to 20 with 11 abstentions).
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PLO and other active Palestinian fighting groups, the various Eritrean
Liberation Fronts, and the Western Somali Liberation Front have not.
A. Reagan's Freedom Fighter Corollary
The rhetoric for this part of the Reagan doctrine has been very distinc-
tive, and both President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz have some-
times been at pains to prove that it is also innovative. On March 1, 1985,
in a much commented-upon speech, Reagan said, "Freedom movements
arise and assert themselves. They're doing so on almost every conti-
nent populated by man-in the hills of Afghanistan, in Angola, in
Kampuchea, in Central America.... They are our brothers, these free-
dom fighters, and we owe them our help.' ' 36 The operational aspects of
this policy were spelled out by Secretary Shultz on February 22, 1985:
How should we act? What should America do to further both its security
interests and the cause of freedom and democracy? A prudent strategy
must combine different elements, suited to different circumstances. First, as
a matter of fundamental principle, the United States supports human rights
and peaceful democratic change throughout the world, including in
noncommunist, pro-Western countries.... Second, we have a moral obli-
gation to support friendly democratic governments by providing economic
and security assistance against a variety of threats .... Third, we should
support the forces of freedom in communist totalitarian states.... Fourth,
and finally, our moral principles compel us to support those struggling
against the imposition of communist tyranny.... The UN and OAS Char-
ters reaffirm the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense
against aggression-aggression of the kind committed by the Soviets in Af-
ghanistan, by Nicaragua in Central America, and by Vietnam in Cambodia.
Material assistance to those opposing such aggression can be a lawful form
of collective self-defense .... Most of what we do to promote freedom is,
and should continue to be, entirely open. Equally, there are efforts that are
most effective when handled quietly.37
Distinctive rhetoric aside, is this really an innovation? Here, again, a
closer look reveals that there is less novelty, in both general and specific
practice, than meets the eye. The Reagan administration is hardly the
first one to provide covert support to insurgencies against existing gov-
ernments. The practice certainly was not unknown to Eisenhower, Ken-
nedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, or Carter. Nor can President Reagan be
credited entirely for his uncommon openness about intervention. Ever
since the Church Committee, an administration that wishes to indulge in
this sort of thing cannot do so as covertly as before, for congressional
36. Conservative PAC Dinner, supra note 28, at 245.
37. Shultz, supra note 31, at 18-19 (emphasis omitted).
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notification and, to an extent, participation, is now required. 38 Nor can
President Reagan claim that he has selected all of his beneficiaries. Some
of Reagan's freedom fighters were already being covertly supported by
Carter. For example, U.S. aid began to go to the Afghan resistance
before Reagan entered office. 39 Finally, President Reagan cannot even
claim that the Executive is leading the Congress in this area. Though
Reagan's enthusiasm for some of his freedom fighters is not always
matched by Congress, as is the case with the contras, Congress is out
ahead of Reagan on others, the prime example being the Afghan
resistance.
B. Brezhnev's Freedom Fighter Corollary
President Reagan is not only following his presidential predecessors;
he is also following his adversary. The Soviet Union has long reserved
the right to support those groups that it deems to be "progressive"
forces. The Brezhnev doctrine, in its various manifestations, was never
simply defensive and conservatory. It was-not designed solely to retain
within the Socialist camp those states that had once opted for it but
whose populations subsequently reconsidered and now wished to opt out.
Kovalev wrote that any struggle for national liberation, anywhere in the
world, must be supported by "genuine revolutionaries," an expansive di-
mension of the doctrine that found no explicit counterpart in U.S. claims
until the Reagan Administration's formulations. According to Kovalev's
explanation, Brezhnev explicitly endorsed pro-active support on behalf of
groups struggling to establish communist governments in countries that
were not communist.
Those who speak of the "illegality" of the allied socialist countries' actions
in Czechoslovakia forget that in a class society there is and can be no such
thing as non-class law. Laws and the norms of law are subordinated to the
laws of class struggle and the laws of social development. These laws are
clearly formulated in the documents jointly adopted by the Communist and
Workers' Parties.... Genuine revolutionaries, as internationalists, cannot
fail to support progressive forces in all countries in their just struggle for
national and social liberation.4°
There is no indication of any moderation of this stance. Gorbachev, it
will be recalled, implied, according to Secretary Schultz, that govern-
ments became independent only when they became socialist.
41
38. See 50 U.S.C. § 413 (1983); see also N.Y. Times, June 21, 1984, at B8, col 3.
39. See Bernstein, Arms for Afghanistan, NEw REPUBLIC, July 18, 1981, at 8-9.
40. Kovalev, supra note 7, at 12.
41. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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The Soviet claim was and continues to be that, the U.N. Charter
notwithstanding, the Soviet Union maintains the right to support those
struggling against existing governments if their struggle is consistent with
historical laws, of which the Soviet government is the exclusively author-
ized interpreter. If the groups succeed, the Soviet Union has the addi-
tional right and obligation to make sure that their members and
constituents do not change their minds in the future. A scholar of no less
stature than Professor Tunkin has sanctified the doctrine as a jus
cogens.42
C. The United Nations' Freedom Fighter Corollary
These particular Soviet and American claims are certainly inconsistent
with the black letter of the U.N. Charter. But they now find parallels in
the contemporary practice of the General Assembly and the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, two important custodians of this basic instru-
ment. Hence the assessment of their lawfulness is necessarily more
complex. To appreciate this fully, one must consider the structural
changes that have taken place in the process of international law-making
over the last forty years.
In 1945, the victors of World War II, then the unchallengeably domi-
nant actors in world politics, turned their attention explicitly to the crea-
tion of international political and legal structures that might perform
certain delegated political functions. The scheme, hammered out at
Yalta and formally installed in San Francisco, essentially codified key
aspects of the prevailing political situation. Effective power was reposed
in the Security Council, where each of the Permanent Members was en-
dowed with a veto.43 High-sounding promises in the Charter notwith-
standing, the other forty-five or so Charter members were given relatively
little power.
Not surprisingly, these other states were dissatisfied and began to agi-
tate for a greater share from the very inception of the organization. After
1949, the United States found it to its advantage to encourage this "de-
mocratizing" trend. Indeed it was the United States that initiated the
"Uniting for Peace" Resolution,44 which established a contingent compe-
tence in the security area for the General Assembly when the Security
Council was blocked. The Soviet Union opposed the change, as the As-
42. G. TUNKIN, supra note 10, at 444.
43. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3.
44. G.A. Res. 377, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950) [herein-
after Uniting for Peace].
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sembly was likely, given its composition at that time, to vote as the
United States wished.
The politics of international organizations changed rapidly. By the
early 1960's, as the process of decolonization accelerated and more and
more new states entered the General Assembly, member states began to
form a relatively independent force in world politics. Increasingly, they
sought to use the powers of the General Assembly to further their polit-
ical objectives by trying to transform the Assembly into a legislature.
The conception of the Assembly and, more generally, of international
organizations, as parliamentary law-making bodies was, if controversial,
certainly not preposterous. There had already been a fair amount of doc-
trinal speculation on the matter.45 Moreover, the U.N. Charter itself, in
articles 2(6) and 13, suggested certain bases for this development. When
it served their purposes, the United States and some of its European allies
had seemed to support the "parliamentary" conception through the
1950's.46 The International Court, for its part, had also given some en-
couragement to the idea.4 7
This emerging conception of law-making was plainly inconsistent with
the older principles, which had been based largely on consent and power.
The new arrangement also enfranchised a large number of weak states by
creating a specially designed arena that permitted them to use their num-
bers against the effective power of the larger states. The full implications
of these changes seem to have been overlooked by the old "haves" for a
number of reasons. Apparently it was felt that the weaker states needed
the stronger states and could not go too far without them. Conversely,
the stronger often needed the weaker in parliamentary arenas as well as
in other junctures of interdependence in world politics. And inevitably,
some of the innovations were favorable to one or the other superpower.
It is astonishing how comprehensive the General Assembly's efforts to
re-legislate international law have been. It has created many new organi-
zations and entities within the U.N. system and major projects on the
oceans, diplomacy, and treaties. More important, General Assembly or
Assembly-inspired initiatives have included efforts to revise basic interna-
45. See, e.g., R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963); Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Compe-
tence of the General Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (1966); Arangio-Ruiz, The Normative
Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Declaration of Principles of
Friendly Relations, 137 RECUEIL DES COURs 444 (1974).
46. See, e.g., Uniting for Peace, supra note 44, at 10. See also Conditions of Admission of
a State to the United Nations, 1948 I.C.J. 57 (Advisory Opinion of May 28, 1948).
47. See, e.g., Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. 174 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 11, 1949); Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962
I.C.J. 150 (Advisory Opinion of June 20, 1962).
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tional economic law under the rubric of the New International Economic
Order,48 to revise the systems of transfer of information under the rubric
of the New International Information Order,49 and, of course, to change
prescriptions regarding the use of force.50
The modus operandi in these new arenas also merits mention. In a
relatively short period of time, majority votes of comprehensive confer-
ences such as the General Assembly were deemed to be, if not interna-
tional law, then at least strong evidence of international law. By 1975,
the International Court of Justice, which had become increasingly ori-
ented toward the General Assembly, also adopted this position.51
Now plainly, the "First" and "Second" Worlds, if one may employ
convenient though often-abused terms, were not always happy about
these efforts to bring about major and consequential changes in interna-
tional constitutive and substantive law. The First World may not have
had the votes, but international politics also involves effective control,
which it had in abundance. Increasingly, the outcomes of the conference
arenas of the 1960's and early 1970's were characterized by the First
World as "irresponsible," yet its protestations were ignored. Thus, on
paper, the resolutions of UNCTAD and the General Assembly reformed
world politics and economics. In practice, however, they effected little
change.
Belatedly, the political leadership of the Third World acknowledged
the problem. Because it stood to gain more from formal institutions than
from informal and non-structured international lawmaking, it collabo-
rated in exploring ways of tempering the illusory power of big numbers.
"Consensus" emerged as a term of art signifying a general agreement to
ignore the formalities of voting where there were automatic majorities
inconsistent with the actual power necessary for making effective legisla-
tion. Decisions came to be shaped through consultations, taking account
of the interests of those who had effective power but who were often, in a
particular structured arena, a numerical minority. Only after such con-
sultations could an agreement become "endorsed" by a formal vote.
Consensus was a creative response but it could only do so much. The
sheer weight of numbers in organized arenas is inevitably felt in the very
decision to hold a conference; in the establishment of its agendas, timeta-
bles, and staffing policies; and in procedural matters. And once a parlia-
48. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doe. A/9631 (1975).
49. See, e.g., 20 UNESCO GCOF Res. 100, UNESCO Doc. 20C/Res. 3/3.1/2 (1978).
50. See, e.g., 1977 Geneva Protocols I and II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977).
51. See, eg., Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of July 25).
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mentary conference is underway, one of the superpowers may determine
that its interests are furthered by the projet and support both the projet
itself and, by implication, the modality by which it is being prescribed.
However, even in the absence of such support, some matters are of such
passionate conviction that compromise via consensus is scarcely possible.
And, even with consensus, this new putative version of international law
has proven unacceptable to key states who are politically strong in objec-
tive terms, but politically weak in parliamentary terms.
The divergence between the two versions of international law is partic-
ularly dramatic with regard to the law of war. The textual universe of
the Charter diverges from inherited customary international law in a
number of ways. In the world that it was designed to effect, unilateral
force is no longer lawful and no longer necessary thanks to the Security
Council, which undertakes responsibility for peace and security and is
assigned the military resources that enable it to make that responsibility
effective.52 The contingencies that justify Council action-"threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" 53-are all apparently
violations of the status quo. Even the right of self-defense is verbally
limited to response to an "armed attack," the term of art for the precipi-
tating event of an act of aggression. And self-defense is permissible only
until the Security Council itself decides how to act (if at all).
5 4
On paper, this is an essentially conserving and non-discriminatory re-
gime, structured to protect the territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence of states against coercive change. There are, of course, other
themes in the Charter, expressed in appraisal, aspirational, and change
norms that transcend national jurisdiction, such as human rights and the
right to self-determination. But the security regime appeared, at least
textually, to have been compartmentalized and insulated from these invo-
cations for change.
The aforementioned emerging international parliamentary arenas have
introduced many changes in this regime. Consider, first, the 1970 Gen-
eral Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law Concern-
ing Friendly Relations,55 a document supported by the United States and
frequently presented by states and by the International Court of Justice
as a codification of contemporary international law. The Declaration
provides in pertinent part:
52. U.N. CHARTER arts. 24, 26.
53. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
54. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
55. G.A. Res. 2526, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doe. A/8028 (1970).
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By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right
freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and
to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State
has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter.56
The operational implications of this right are spelled out three
paragraphs later:
Every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives
peoples ... of their right to self-determination and freedom and indepen-
dence. In their actions against and resistance to such forcible action in pur-
suit of the exercise of self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and
to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
Charter. 
5 7
By drawing upon the divergent themes in the Charter, the beginning of
an attempt at inverting customary law may be noted. "Peoples" have the
right to "resist" when a "state" forcibly impedes their right to "self-de-
termination" and "freedom and independence." The state against which
groups who have won the title of "people" are struggling may constitute,
by its very obduracy, a "threat to the peace" within the meaning of the
Charter-a legal refinement for which Professor McDougal and I are, in
part, responsible.58 Rather than defend itself, that state must refrain
from any action that impedes the struggle, that is, it must refrain from
action that could otherwise be characterized as self-defense. Third states
are obliged to help the struggling groups, and cannot be held legally re-
sponsible by the targeted state for that help.
This "inversion" is not limited to a few historical atavisms. While
decolonization may have had a historically specific reference for some of
the drafters in 1970 and been limited to Portuguese territories and to the
continuing human rights abominations in South Africa, some drafters
surely were thinking of Israel, while others were likely thinking of groups
like the Sandinistas, Sentero Luminoso, the IRA, the Moro Liberation
Front, or even the Red Brigade. Certainly the final draft favors those
who wish the broader conception. Terms such as "self-determination"
or "freedom and independence" are open-ended and can be applied to
any group that a majority, or possibly only a substantial number, of
members of the General Assembly wishes.
56. Id. at 123.
57. Id. at 124 (emphasis added).
58. McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of Interna-
tional Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 5 (1968).
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Additional Protocol I of 197759 reinforces this trend in Article 1(4).
By internationalizing the struggles endorsed in the Declaration, it facili-
tates the fulfillment of the international obligation of assistance estab-
lished in the Declaration. Contemporaneous statements by delegates
confirm this intention.60 Articles 43 and 44 further discriminate in favor
of guerillas, the preferred form of warriors of national liberation, by dis-
charging them from the fixed insignia requirement of customary interna-
tional law and the need to comply with that law, while still giving them
the law's benefits. Yet the Protocol prohibits reprisals 61 and more gener-
ally bars the use of the military instrument for political objectives.
62
The 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages63 is
even more explicit in setting out some of the operational implications of
this inversion. Article 1(1) defines the prohibited offense as follows:'
Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to con-
tinue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the "hostage") in
order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovern-
mental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to
do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the
release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages ("hostage
taking") within the meaning of this Convention.
But Article 12 of the same Convention provides in pertinent part:
[T]he present Convention shall not apply to an act of hostage-taking com-
mitted in the course of armed conflict as defined in the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 and the Protocols thereto, including armed conflicts mentioned in
article 1, paragraph 4, of Additional Protocol I of 1977, in which peoples
are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against
racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as en-
shrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Princi-
ples of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
64
These examples are cited to clarify that a very distinctive version of inter-
national law as it relates to the use of the military instrument was emerg-
ing from the institutions of formal international law-making over an
extended period of time. That conception was straying quite far from
customary international law. Indeed, a new type of "just war" was being
created.
59. U.N. Doc. A/32/144, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977).
60. See Roberts, The New Rules For Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of Addi-
tional Protocol I, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 109 (1985).
61. Geneva Additional Protocol I, supra note 50, art. 51, para. 6.
62. Id. art. 52, para. 2.
63. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/L.23, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979).
64. Id. art. 12, para. 12.
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The new pattern of application of these particular legal norms can be
seen by examining recent decisions by the political organs of the United
Nations and recent judgments of the I.C.J.65 In all these cases and inci-
dents, one finds two innovations. First, a hitherto unimplemented aspira-
tional norm is now being used to recharacterize, retroactively, a hitherto
lawful situation as unlawful. The state defending itself from change is
now per se the law-breaker. This development shifts international law,
which formerly had been largely status quo-oriented and would have
leaned in favor of the existing state, toward a new posture in favor of the
party that significant groups in the United Nations choose to view as
struggling for "freedom and independence." Second, and more subtle,
the content of the Charter conception of aggression and self-defense is
being changed to preclude incursive responses by the target state into the
territory of another state in which the attacker has found haven. The
customary right of self-defense is being redefined more restrictively and
with different contingencies. The effect of this innovation is to allow the
internationally-approved, low-level, and protracted belligerent to operate
with impunity outside the target state, while the target state is permitted
to apprehend its adversary only within its own territory.
This revision of the formal theory of self-defense developed over a pe-
riod of time. There has been much discussion of whether the Charter
merely acknowledges the continuing legal effect of the customary right of
self-defense or establishes an entirely new Charter-based "right." The
issue is not theoretical or abstract, for suppression of the customary doc-
trine would also limit the competence of a state contemplating self-de-
fense as to contingencies and circumstances of a lawful self-defense. The
U.N. General Assembly has assumed the competence to define the exclu-
sive contingency for lawful Charter-based self-defense. The technical
term for that contingency is "armed attack." Article 3(g) of the Defini-
tion of Aggression, adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 3314
(XXIX),66 establishes what initially appears to be a quantitative thresh-
old for the right of self-defense. Thus, an armed attack includes:
[t]he sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another state of
such gravity as to amount to [inter alia an actual armed attack conducted by
regular forces, Article 3(a)]... or its substantial involvement therein. 67
65. Cf Kwakwa, South Africa's May 1986 Military Incursions into Neighboring African
States, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 421 (1987) (excellent discussion of the international reaction to
South Africa's May 1986 attacks on guerillas based in neighboring states).
66. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 143, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
67. Id. (emphasis added).
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In its affirmative part, this definition says that the mere fact that armed
bands emanate from one state and engage in military activities in another
state does not constitute "armed attack," the contingency that would
presumably justify the Charter-based privilege to respond to the incur-
sions wherever they might be unfolding. Should the attacked state none-
theless fight back, its action will be considered aggressive. Only when the
attack by irregulars is of such gravity as to amount to an actual armed
attack may the attacked state respond in self-defense. In other words,
only when this unspecified threshold is exceeded is the victim state enti-
tled under this new theory to take measures of self-defense. Obviously,
this is a formula favorable to what has come to be called "protracted
low-level conflict," which by definition does not reach the level of
"armed attack."
The implications of this innovation were made explicit and developed
logically by the I.C.J. in its judgment on the merits in the Nicaragua
case.68 The present exposition is not aimed at examining the accuracy of
the Court's holding. The holding contained many problems, and most of
the Court's assertions of customary international law are based on noth-
ing other than its ipse dixit. Rather, the present analysis simply traces
the Court's development of the above trend.
In Nicaragua, the I.C.J. superordinated the Assembly's definition of
use of force by attempting to transform it into customary law and vice-
versa. It thereby excluded, it would seem, the old customary rights, in-
cluding the general right of reprisal. Consider the Court's statement at
paragraph 181:
However, so far from having constituted a marked departure from a cus-
tomary international law which still exists unmodified, the Charter gave
expression in this field to principles already present in customary interna-
tional law, and that law has in the subsequent four decades developed under
the influence of the Charter, to such an extent that a number of rules con-
tained in the Charterhave acquired a status independent of it. The essen-
tial consideration is that both the Charter and the customary international
law flow from a common fundamental principle outlawing the use of force
in international relations .... 69
Thus, the Court's merger would exclude any unilateral rights to the use
of force that derived from customary law and would superordinate the
Assembly's regime and the Assembly's apparatus for its illumination.
What, then, is this new conception of the lawful contingency for the right
of self-defense?
68. See supra note 34.
69. Id. at 96-97.
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The Court narrows even further the General Assembly's already atten-
uated conception of the contingencies for self-defense. It excludes from
"armed attack," and hence from the right of self-defense, many of the
methods of low-level, protracted conflict. First, the Court insists that
acts of armed bands must "occur on a significant scale."' 70 Second, the
Court excludes by definition from the category of armed attack "assist-
ance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or
other support. '71 The language of the Court here is instructive: "Such
assistance may be regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to
intervention in the internal or external affairs of other States."'72 How-
ever, the Court holds that these are Charter terms of art that do not
authorize self-defense by the target state but only actuate a contingent
competence of the Security Council. If the target state thinks it can se-
cure assistance from the Council, it can repair there-assuming that the
Council agrees, is not vetoed, and has the ability to restrain the party
"threatening" or "using" force.
If the Council is completely unable to act, the target state can theoreti-
cally repair to the General Assembly.73 But this would avail it only if the
Assembly decides that the group attacking or assisting the military ac-
tion in the target state is not "struggling for its freedom and indepen-
dence." The critical point is that what the group initiating the cross-
border violence is doing does not, by definition, amount to an armed
attack, and hence never warrants in response unilateral use of force char-
acterized as self-defense. If the target state does respond to low-level
activities by force, its action itself is by definition a violation of interna-
tional law.
Thus, the new theory in the final analysis prevents the target state
from doing anything effective, for according to the I.C.J., low-level at-
tacks do not permit the victim state to resort to levels of coercion con-
templated in the right of self-defense. In the most common form of
contemporary conflict, the I.C.J. issues one of the parties round after
round of blanks. Moreover, the new theory trumps the older theory of
customary rights of self-defense, for the asymmetry that has been estab-
lished here is one that, pace the Court, is identical in both conventional
international law (the Charter) and customary international law.
70. Id. at 104.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. U.N. CHARTER art. 35 (allowing a member or a non-member, under certain condi-
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In short, the strand of international law that is championed by major
international institutions has come to facilitate the expansive components
of the Brezhnev and Reagan doctrines, for it renders lawful and endorses
support of insurgencies against established governments. Rather than
that support being delictual, it is the resistance (heretofore known as the
self-defense) of the targeted government that is delictual, for it is con-
ducted with the aim of preventing "self-determination and freedom and
independence."
D. Superpower Adaptations
The purpose of this rather complex review is to show that in the con-
text of international legal developments, President Reagan is blazing no
new trails. The expansive component of the Reagan doctrine merely
tracks the Brezhnev doctrine and builds on an international legal version
that has been developed and illuminated by the U.N. General Assembly
and the I.C.J. Apparently Reagan's advisers assume that if this is the
way the game is to be played by others, then it is surely the way the
United States will play. If the Soviet Union reserves the privilege of se-
lective meddling in other countries' affairs, then the United States will
claim the same privilege. If the Brezhnev doctrine is internationally law-
ful in this regard, then the Reagan doctrine is, at the least, entitled to try
to establish its own lawfulness.
The evaluation of this ddmarche strictly in terms of effective and bene-
ficial national policy will depend on assessments of whether, among the
marginally effective governments of the world, governments favorable to
the United States can withstand such meddling by others, while govern-
ments hostile to the United States cannot, thus adjusting internal ar-
rangements or external alignments in ways deemed more favorable to the
United States. It is not possible to make such an appraisal in any system-
atic fashion here but I would suggest that, for many reasons, Western
democracies, compared to their totalitarian counterparts, are remarkably
ill-equipped to play this meddling game. This year marks the twentieth
anniversary of the Brezhnev doctrine, suggesting that the Soviet Union
still believes that its gains under the doctrine outweigh its losses. To be
sure, General Secretary Gorbachev said on November 2, 1987, that "all
the Communist parties are fully and irreversibly self-governing.... The
period of the Comintern, Cominform, and even of binding international
consultation has passed."' 74 We will only know if this is a genuine
74. Quoted in Ulam, Moscow Stalling, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 7, 1987, at 13 (emphasis in
original).
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Gorbachev Doctrine fully repealing Brezhnev when the next popular up-
rising occurs in Central Europe. In the meantime, no Soviet garrisons
have been withdrawn anywhere. Until they are, it would be sensible to
heed Adam Ulam's observation that Gorbachev "has not become the
general secretary to preside over the liquidation of the Communist
empire."
'75
E. International Legal Evaluation
From the standpoint of international policy, the erosion of the norm of
non-intervention in favor of more latitude for interventions for national
purposes is plainly destructive of the common interests in minimum or-
der. Unlike the defensive dimensions of the Brezhnev and Reagan doc-
trines, their corresponding expansive dimensions do not contribute to the
maintenance of minimum order. Instead, they are lamentable, and must
be viewed as part of the general deterioration of the collective security
system as originally contemplated by the U.N. Charter. Alas, however,
that deterioration appears irreversible, with both the General Assembly
and now the International Court providing direction, approval, and ac-
celeration. Short of a new superpower accord requiring each to abjure
the expansive part of its respective doctrine, these types of actions will
continue.
Can the lawfulness of such actions still be appraised in terms of inter-
national law? Plainly, the effort must be made if it is assumed that the
pattern will persist: to refuse to appraise lawfulness will simply reward
the successful law-breaker. The evaluation of the lawfulness of such
uses of force is not impossible. Force per se is not unlawful; indeed, it is
inseparable from law. What is unlawful is force that is used for illicit
ends. The critical question, then, in a decentralized system is not
whether coercion has been applied, but whether it has been applied in
support of or against community order and basic policies, and whether it
has been applied in ways whose net consequences include increased con-
gruence with community goals and minimum order. In these terms,
Grenada can hardly be placed in the same category as Afghanistan. In
terms of consequences for a world order of human dignity, the Brezhnev
and Reagan doctrines may prove to be quite different from each other
indeed.
75. Id.
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